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Introduction
Dissent is not simply a specialized mode of politics that is entered into cautiously and
that, once destroyed by the state, has no political or social power; instead, dissent, like all
actions, is political because it endangers the fragile and generally accepted norms of society and
exposes the cracks and fissures in foundational political systems. What I mean by this is that
dissent, as in the act of living within the truth, is the only way to actually live, and because all
actions—whether in dissent or consent with the state—are ultimately political, any form of
dissent holds substantial political and social power, and can catalyze untold waves of public
adjustment. Ultimately, dissent has the capacity to pioneer new discoveries about social reality
and can empower political possibility, and from this ever-expanding politics of dissent can
emerge a rich pluralistic society.
This paper will be an investigation of dissent as an individual act of “living within the
truth,”1 as well as the effect of dissent on the macropolitical scale—primarily within totalitarian
regimes, though also expanded into a more general concept of progressive politics. First, I will
employ chapters from Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism to answer these
questions: What is totalitarianism? And what role do lies and pseudo-reality play in totalitarian
regimes? Then, I will move on to the following questions: Is there a responsibility to dissent?
What is the aim of dissent? And what power does dissent hold within a political community? To
answer these questions as they pertain to authoritarian regimes, I will use sections from The
Power of the Powerless by Vaclav Havel, and to broaden the political philosophy of dissent and
apply it to contemporary American politics, I will use a chapter from The Fragility of Things by
William Connolly entitled “Role Experimentation and Democratic Activism.”

Vaclav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” International Journal of Politics (1979): 35,
https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/1979/01/the-power-of-the-powerless.pdf.
1
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Part I
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt outlines the preconditions for the
emergence of the totalitarian state, primarily using the historical rise of Nazi Germany in the
1930s as a model. She argues that the single most important precondition is for the masses to be
generally disillusioned with both the reality of their lives and reality (or truth) as a concept; the
people must be willing to not believe their eyes and to believe (or, at least, go along with) an
aspiring totalitarian who will tell them what they want to hear.2 Truth, in short, must be
completely irrelevant to the masses: “In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses
had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think
that everything was possible and that nothing was true.”3 Furthermore, mass disillusionment with
truth emerges, Arendt argues, as a result of suffering and loneliness, which she describes as “the
experience of not belonging to the world at all.”4 In power, totalitarians use this backdrop of
pseudo-reality as “an organizational device,”5 and though some of the people may believe
totalitarian conspiracies, and others may not, it ultimately does not matter as the masses act as if
they have this belief, and this gives real power to totalitarian leaders.
Most politicians are primarily concerned with their own political preservation, and
totalitarians are no different: in power, they concern themselves, above all, with annihilating the
individual. Individuality is an expression of freedom, as it constitutes the freedom to define
oneself. Freedom directly threatens totalitarianism because it allows constituents of the regime to
operate within reality—that is, outside the totalitarian’s faux-reality. In effect, this has the

Hannah Arendt, “The Totalitarian Movement,” in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Part 3 (San Diego: Harcourt
Books, 1951), 80.
3
Ibid.
4
Hannah Arendt, “Ideology and Terror,” in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Part 3 (San Diego: Harcourt Books,
1951), 173.
5
Arendt, “The Totalitarian Movement,” 85.
2
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potential to shatter the totalitarian illusion—to point out that the emperor has no clothes.6 To
combat individuality, totalitarianism takes over the lives of the masses through ritual, ideology,
and terror: “By pressing men against each other, total terror destroys the space between them…
It destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion
which cannot exist without space.”7

Vaclav Havel, in The Power of the Powerless, draws greatly from Arendt’s
conceptualization of totalitarianism, particularly emphasizing the use of ideology by the
totalitarian as a justification for the annihilation of the individual.8 Havel also reaffirms Arendt’s
argument that untruth is at the heart of totalitarianism, stating that the regime “must falsify
everything.”9
Havel’s strength in The Power of the Powerless is his use of the metaphysics of
state-constitution in explaining the immense power of dissent. He argues that all states—not just
democracies—have a kind of social contract, albeit the totalitarian contract being significantly
one-sided. In totalitarian states, this contract is manifested in the compliance of the masses with
the rituals—which I consider to be a combination of diktats and public acts according to those
diktats, and shrouded by ideology—demanded by the state. The power of the state in the system,
however, is only in the people complying, and the regime itself only has the power of brute
strength propping up a totalitarian society; in short, compliance is lawcraft.10 As such, political
systems are constituted only by the compliance of individuals: “By this very fact, individuals
confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, are the system.”11
6

Havel, 22.
Arendt, “Ideology and Terror,” 164.
8
Havel, 7.
9
Ibid, 9.
10
Ibid, 15.
11
Ibid, 9.
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In order to ensure continued loyalty, totalitarians set up controlled decisions for citizens,
forcing the people to constantly reaffirm the power of the regime.12 Each of these confrontations,
however, provides an opportunity for dissent. “Living within the truth,”13 as Havel describes
dissent, is any act executed outside of the control of the totalitarian, as it threatens to reveal to
others that the system is a lie. The totalitarian state can survive as long as nobody lives within the
truth because “as long as appearance is not confronted with reality, it does not seem to be
appearance.”14 But any foray into reality, however small and inconsequential, threatens to topple
the entire illusion: “Every free expression of life indirectly threatens the posttotalitarian system
politically.”15
Havel argues that dissent is an overtly political act because of its political power, but its
catalyst is fundamentally private. People choose to live within the truth not because they have the
lofty ambition of overthrowing the regime, but because their moral salvation depends on
escaping the totalitarian world of untruth, and they cannot stomach the politics of lies. This
somewhat optimistic view further manifests in his argument that dissent is spontaneous and
occurs across the spectrum of life: “A ‘dissident’ is simply a physicist, a sociologist, a worker, a
poet, individuals who are doing what they feel they must and, consequently, who find themselves
in open conflict with the regime.”16

William Connolly in The Fragility of Things illustrates the emergence of a totalitarian
pseudo-reality within contemporary American democracy, which he describes as the “resonance

12

Ibid, 14.
Ibid, 19.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid, 22.
16
Ibid, 39.
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machine.”17 This is a system between right-wing media and the people who consume that media,
in which truth is irrelevant and the media tells the masses what they want to hear, forming
ressentiment in the Nietzschean sense. In describing the “resonance machine,” Connolly makes
relevant the politics of dissent to contemporary America, providing a critical bridge between
totalitarianism and the pliable democratic masses.
Connolly’s conceptualization of society—democratic or otherwise—echoes Havel’s
metaphysics in describing the implicit social contract that acts as an illusory bind between the
masses and the state; Connolly expands this metaphysics, however, into the world of role
performance, comparing Judith Butler’s philosophy of gender performance to the politics of
dissent.18 Connolly argues that the roles we perform in society define us: “You are, in part, a
composite of the roles in which you participate, even though you overflow the composite.”19
Dissent is a break with the set of roles that society recognizes and accepts, and, as such, it pushes
the boundaries on what is conceived of as a potential politics—this expansion of the
conceptualizable occurs across society and is not confined to dissenters. Role experimentation
(as Connolly codes dissent), even at the most minute scale, has the power to redefine roles and
norms, especially as a public act, which can translate micropolitics into macropolitics.20
Connolly’s most effective argument is that politics, as with philosophy, is inescapable:
“There is no zone of complete neutrality in a world of role performances.”21 Whether we desire
to or not, the way we embody the roles we identify with is political, because it is a fundamentally
public act; indeed, “Our lives are messages.”22 Realizing this truth, we can begin to embark on
William Connolly, “Role Experimentation and Democratic Activism,” in The Fragility of Things (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2013), 180.
18
Ibid, 183–184.
19
Ibid, 182.
20
Ibid, 184.
21
Ibid, 185.
22
Ibid.
17
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the painstaking, life-long work of crafting those messages toward a positive objective—this is
the politics of dissent. The politics of dissent is working to better understand the roles we
embody and to improve them for the good of others—in a spirit, as Connolly puts it, of
“existential gratitude.”23

Part II
Dissent in the traditional sense is something slightly less violent than rebellion, emerging
out of the oppression of dictatorial and totalitarian states. Sometimes it is used to describe
popular organized opposition in democracies, with images of protests with people chanting and
holding signs coming to mind. I, in agreement with Havel and Connolly, reject this description;
instead, dissent is much more a way of living than an overtly political ritual. I also agree with
Arendt and Havel’s argument that dissent is effective because it rejects the totalitarian premise
that truth is irrelevant and an inconvenience; instead, politics must be grounded in the real world
because the real world is the only world in which progress can occur—in which people’s lives
can be improved.
Havel believed that dissent emerges solely out of a kind of love for truth felt
spontaneously across society.24 This is not the case: instead, dissent, though it is expressed only
by those who desire to live within the truth, is always political, meaning that political calculation
plays an essential role in the decision to dissent. Havel idealizes a scenario in which thousands
suddenly decide to dissent and refuse one of the regime’s loyalty tests, with which citizens are
confronted constantly. What he ignores in this scenario is both the very real cost of dissent and
the extent to which role expectations are ingrained in the public psyche. Dissent requires an

23
24

Ibid, 181.
Havel, 39.
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incredible amount of bravery and sacrifice, and by painting it as an easy-to-make decision, Havel
forgets the power of the regime. That being said, dissent is effective precisely because it is so
dangerous: it sends a message. The real power of dissent is that it confronts the regime with a
disloyalty test: in the hierarchy of punishment for role experimentation, each rung is ultimately
an individual, and the punishment of a dissident forces those individuals to reassess their
relationship with the regime. To dissent is to envision and strive for a better reality, one within
the realm of the truth but not yet realized. To dissent is to deliberately confront the system and
society with the damage that living within a lie does. Every time someone dissents, the system
must reassess its position on dissent, and each arrest that follows weakens the regime because
fewer people can turn a blind eye to the fact that the regime is a lie, and that the people
ultimately constitute the state. Dissent, therefore, is both a public act (meaning that its objective
is entirely political, whether dissidents intend it to be or not) and a selfless one, as individual
dissidents understand the punishment they will suffer for dissenting, and merely hope to pave the
way for a reform they will not live to see.
Connolly’s line of thinking in The Fragility of Things, though effective in translating
dissent into an effective political strategy for contemporary America, falls short of crafting a
politics of dissent, in which difference is perceived to be what it truly is: an opportunity. The
closest he comes to a politics of dissent is what he calls the “creative resonance machine,” in
which role experimentation is amplified in the public sphere.25 What he misses is the fact that
there is already a conceptualization of a “creative resonance machine”: democracy. The goal of
democracy is to translate the policy and societal preferences of the masses into representation by
policymakers. In a perfect democracy, according to this definition, role experimentation would
be reflected in the ideas and objectives of representatives, once support for specific role revisions
25

Connolly, 194.
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reached a given threshold. Once seated, that representative would then advocate for policy
change to reflect role experimentation, accelerating and aiding in the redefinition, rejection, or
addition of that role on the micropolitical level.
In this conceptualization of the politics of dissent I reject the premise from both Havel
and Connolly that significant policy change only goes from micropolitics to macropolitics;
instead, it can go either way, with the macropolitical almost always driving change. To achieve
the politics of dissent, the path forward is in systemic reform—reform primarily in the process of
translation from micropolitical preference to macropolitical representation and power. In better
aligning the masses and the democratic state, role experimentation can function as a process of
democracy, ensuring that the “people” is ever-expanding and that individuals accumulate power
in proportion to their due.

Hanson 9
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